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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
GEORGE RONALD WRIGHT,

]

Plaintiff and Appellant, ])
vs.

Case No. 900300 CA

]

WESTSIDE NURSERY, a Utah
limited partnership, and
DARREL HUMPHRIES, an
individual,

]
Priority No. 14b
]

Defendants and Appellees.
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred upon the
above-entitled court by provision of Section 78-2a-3(2)(j), U.C.A.
1953 as amended.
NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff initiated this civil proceeding in the Fifth
District Court and Defendants counterclaimed. Following trial and
the denial of post-trial motions for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict and for new trial, Plaintiff appealed seeking reversal of
the

judgment

awarding

Defendants

damages

for

fraudulent

misrepresentation and challenging other aspects of the proceedings.
Defendants cross-appealed seeking the entry of judgment awarding
damages

for the wrongful termination of Defendant Humphries'

employment contract and other relief. The prior appeal was before
this Court as case no. 880544-CA.
This Court reversed and vacated the judgment for damages
arising out of the alleged fraudulent misrepresentation, affirmed
1

1 In i

] iidqiiN " "i I

i

i I n ' i * I (Mil

1 I Hi 11

1 I'H' dm " d r in I

i mil1

Plaintiff tu reimburse Defendant Humphries ceiLain iundb deposited
directly into the Westside Nursery account, affirmed the judgment
il I ni | lilt'

i MI I i«in ni I

I Hi ill

I ho

< "i mi I

had

d e n o»d

Humphi II>H

dajiiaqeb

hiinr

wrongful termination, reversed the judgment In the extent that the
district court had refused to exonerate the preliminary injunction
111 j 1 1 1 1 11 ni ni 1 i o 11111111 i i j 11 I 111 >

attorney

fees

I I n 1 || 111 i | H ni is i" 111 11 s s i- * s n i n q I" I r\ i n t 1 1 1 " 11

11") «i" i i»i

reasonably

incurred

mi

appeal

and

considering

r e d u c t i on 11L t h e at t o r n o y i or«i awa rdod lief o n r l a n t s a t
(in

remana,

i tie n i s i n i i

a g a i n s t D e f e n d a n t s hot

< nm i

risspshHii

a

trial ,
ai lonirney

IHHS

r e f u s e d t o reduce t h e iit.torney t e e s awarded

nefeiniirit «

I < " t < md

stricken,

Fnnni

I I hill

» d<»» "«1 P1' n id i i • ""s b x i i of c o s t s on a p p e a l
mdci

h l a i n t it I

f

prosecutes

t In i it

MM mid

appeal•
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
I

Court's

I

0|-Liu. J ii

miI

a..-

I ni i d

leiiyinq

11 I

I 'I in ni J

i'laintjtf

o r d e r i n g P l a i n t i f i "s hi 1 I ol" c o s t s
1

II mi II i II

I I .11 f 11 : l

i

mi I erfiit'i-"-" I i jfiii(

M
, coasts

nil

appeal

and

I Ii i ,ri

m

stricken?

i i JIII i 1 i i mi

ni i

d u s i iiiiiiji I 11 i

it

II y t IIin

attorney tees awarded Humphries at trial?
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The text of a 1 ] re] evant author it i es i s quoted i n the

Utah Rules

of Appe] late Procedure, togethei: wi th

committee's note are included as Addendum A.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The prior appeal was decided on February 2, 1990, and is
reported at 127 Utah Adv. Rep. 21, 787 P.2d 508.
opinion is attached as Addendum B.

A copy of that

References to the language of

the opinion are located by citing the reporters.
For the sake of clarity and continuity, the Appellant is
referred

to

hereinafter

as

"Wright"

and

the

Appell€*es, as

"Humphries."
On the prior appeal, the principal issues Wright raised
related to fraudulent misrepresentation, repayment of funds which
Humphries had deposited into the Westside Nursery account and the
exoneration of a preliminary injunction bond.
On cross-appeal, Humphries sought the entry of a judgment
for wrongful termination of his employment contract, additional
interest and attorney fees on his "indemnification" claim, and
prejudgment interest on the fraud claim.
Wright prevailed on every issue presented on the appeal
with the exception of the issue relating to the repayment of funds
deposited into the nursery account.

Humphries was denied any

relief on his cross-appeal.
This Court ultimately reduced Humphries' net judgment
(excluding

attorney

fees)

from

Accordingly, the Court concluded:

$58,780.21

to

$20,180.00.

"[S]ome adjustment may be

necessary so that [Humphries] does not recover [attorney] fees
attributable to issues on which he did not prevail." 127 Utah Adv.
Rep. at 27, 787 P.2d at 517.
3

Finally, this Court concluded that Wright was "properly
regarded as the party who prevailed on appeal and 'is entitled on
remand to an award of [his] attorney fees reasonably incurred on
appeal.'" 127 Utah Adv. Rep. at 27, 787 P.2d at 517.
The remittitur was docketed in the district court on
March 6, 1990 (R 1).

On March 7, Wright filed his bill of costs

and mailed a photocopy thereof to Humphries' attorney on the same
day (R 14-15).
Wright simultaneously

filed a motion to reduce the

attorney fees awarded Humphries at trial and to assess against
Humphries the attorney fees which Wright reasonably incurred on
appeal (R 12-13, 16-17).
(R 18-19).

That motion was heard on March 21, 1990

At the hearing, Humphries verbally, and for the first

time, voiced an objection to the bill of costs.
As the hearing proceeded, Wright's counsel testified that
fully 90% of his fee was attributable to the defense of the fraud
claim which Humphries had asserted against Wright (T 6).

On the

other hand, Humphries' counsel stated that only approximately 20%
of his time was related to the fraud issue (T 19). He expressed no
opinion regarding the amount of time expended in connection with
the

wrongful

termination

claim

which

failed

in

post-trial

proceedings and ultimately on Humphries' cross-appeal (T 19-20).
Wright's counsel, in testimony, suggested an adjustment
based upon the 66% reduction on the judgment mandated by the Court
of Appeals as a reasonable basis for reducing the attorney fees
awarded Humphries at trial (T 7).
4

Humphries' counsel suggested that inasmuch as the jury
had not awarded him all of the attorney fees he had sought, the
jury had already made an appropriate adjustment in Humphries'
attorney fees (T 16).
Because it was impossible to divine the basis of the jury
award of attorney fees and determine how much of the award was
attributable to issues upon which Humphries did not ultimately
prevail, the district court refused to make any adjustment of the
award (T 24-26; R 20-23; See Addendum D ) .
Finally, the district court ordered Wright's bill of
costs stricken (R 21) because the opinion of "the Court of Appeals
doesn't mention costs" (T 24).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Wright was specifically identified as "the party who
prevailed on appeal" and is under prevailing rules and precedents,
entitled to the costs he incurred on the prior appeal.
The district court was presented ample evidence upon
which it could have made a reasonable reduction of the attorney
fees awarded Humphries at trial.

In light of the substantial

modification of the judgment on appeal, the district court €>rred in
refusing to make any modification of Humphries' attorney fees.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
WRIGHT WAS ENTITLED TO AND AWARDED COSTS ON THE
PRIOR APPEAL.
On the prior appeal this Court concluded that Wright was
5

"properly regarded as the party who prevailed on appeal and 'is
entitled on remand to an award of [his] attorney fees reasonably
incurred on appeal.'"
Rule 34, R.Utah Ct.App., effective at the time of the
decision on the prior appeal, provided in relevant part:
(a) To whom awarded. Except as otherwise provided
by law, if an appeal is dismissed, costs shall be
taxed against the appellant unless otherwise agreed
by the parties or ordered by the court; if a
judgment or order is affirmed, costs shall be taxed
against the appellant unless otherwise ordered; if
a judgment or order is reversed, costs shall be
taxed against the respondent unless otherwise
ordered; if a judgment or order is affirmed or
reversed in part, or is vacated, costs shall be
allowed as ordered by the court.
Paragraph (c) then enumerates the items taxable as costs
"in favor of the prevailing party in the appeal" and paragraph (d)
mentions "the cost bill of the prevailing party."
When the new rules of appellate practice were proposed in
1984, the language of proposed Rule 34 was substantially the same
as that quoted above.

The Advisory Committee Note1 regarding

Paragraph (a) stated:
This Paragraph provides that the prevailing party
shall generally be awarded costs, unless the
Supreme Court orders otherwise.
It is not
anticipated that the written opinion of the Supreme
Court will, after adoption of this rule,
specifically award costs unless there is a
departure from the general rule.
In delivering its opinion this Court took time to analyze
the numerous issues presented on appeal and cross-appeal concluded

Attached Addendum A is a reproduction of Rule 34 as proposed in 1984,
together with the Advisory Committee Note. When the Court of Appeals was later
created, Rule 34 was adopted as a rule of this Court with only minor changes.
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t h a t Wright was "the party who p r e v a i l e d on appeal" and ordered the
d i s t r i c t court t o award him a t t o r n e y f e e s reasonably incurred on
the appeal.
The d e s i g n a t i o n of Wright as "the party who p r e v a i l e d on
appeal" and t h e award of a t t o r n e y f e e s are incongruous with the
district

c o u r t ' s c o n c l u s i o n t h a t Wright i s

not e n t i t l e d t o

the

c o s t s incurred on the appeal. 2
In Everts v . Worrell, 58 Utah 238, 197 P. 1043 ( 1 9 2 1 ) ,
Everts won t h e r e v e r s a l of a judgment i n favor of Worrell.

The

Utah Supreme Court's opinion concluded with the f o l l o w i n g :
Judgment i s t h e r e f o r e r e v e r s e d , and t h e causes
remanded t o the d i s t r i c t court of Weber county,
w i t h d i r e c t i o n s t o grant P l a i n t i f f a new t r i a l a t
defendant's c o s t .
On remand the d i s t r i c t court refused t o a l l o w Everts t o
enforce
language

a judgment for c o s t s
of

the

a g a i n s t Worrell,

Supreme Court opinion t o

interpreting

apply o n l y t o

i n c i d e n t t o t h e new t r i a l and not t o c o s t s on appeal.

the
costs

On E v e r t s '

a p p l i c a t i o n for w r i t of mandate, Everts v . Barker. 58 Utah 519, 200

2

In r e c i t i n g t h e b a s i s of i t s d e c i s i o n , the d i s t r i c t court s t a t e d :
[BY THE COURT] In reviewing t h e opinion i n t h i s c a s e , the
Court of Appeals d o e s n ' t mention c o s t s •
I don't know i f
t h a t ' s because no a p p l i c a t i o n was made for c o s t s before t h e
Court of Appeals, or because t h e i s s u e j u s t wasn't c o n s i d e r e d .
But whatever t h e reason, t h e Court of Appeals, i n f a c t , did
not award Mr. Wright h i s c o s t s .
Going s t r i c t l y by t h e language of Rule 34, I have t o conclude,
t h e r e f o r e , t h a t t h i s Court i s without j u r i s d i c t i o n t o make any
determination on t h e a p p l i c a b i l i t y or t h e award of c o s t s as
requested by Mr. Wright.
That's an i s s u e t h a t should have
been r a i s e d and decided upon before the Court of Appeals.
Therefore, t h e request for an award of c o s t s i s denied.

T.

24.

7

P. 473 (1921), the Supreme Court held that the language of an
appellate opinion must be construed in light of the circumstances
of the case and prevailing rules of practice and precedents.

An

opinion must not be construed so as to result in an absurdity. The
writ was issued.3
Wright incurred an expense of nearly $3,000 in merely
having a transcript of the trial proceedings prepared for review on
appeal.

A construction of the appellate opinion denying Wright

costs will effectively impose upon him all of the costs associated
with marshalling the evidence on an appeal in which he prevailed.
The order of the district court must be reversed and
Wright's bill of costs reinstated and enforced as a judgment.
POINT II
HUMPHRIES HAS WAIVED ANY OBJECTION TO WRIGHT'S BILL
OF COSTS BY HIS FAILURE TO OBJECT THERETO.
Under Rule 3 4 ( d ) , R.Utah C t . A p p . , any o b j e c t i o n t o a b i l l
o f c o s t s had t o be f i l e d w i t h i n f i v e days o f t h e s e r v i c e o f

the

b i l l , t o g e t h e r w i t h a m o t i o n t o have t h e c o s t s t a x e d by t h e c o u r t .
"If t h e r e i s no o b j e c t i o n t o t h e b i l l o f c o s t s w i t h i n t h e
time,

the clerk

of

that

court

shall

tax the costs

e n t e r judgment f o r t h e p a r t y e n t i t l e d t h e r e t o * * *
bill

of

the prevailing party i s

t i m e l y opposed,

as

allotted
filed

and

If the

cost

the clerk,

upon

Uncertain about the appropriate means of procuring enforcement of t h i s
Court's p r i o r d e c i s i o n and review of the d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s orders on remand,
Wright w i l l simultaneously p e t i t i o n t h i s Court for writ in t h e form of mandate.
In some j u r i s d i c t i o n s c o s t s are taxed by the c l e r k of t h e a p p e l l a t e court and any
o b j e c t i o n t o t h e C l e r k ' s determination i s considered d i r e c t l y by the a p p e l l a t e
c o u r t . See Family Medical Bldq. v. S t a t e , D . S . H . S . , 38 Wash.App. 738, 689 P.2d
413 (1984).

8

reasonable notice and hearing, shall tax the costs and enter a
final determination and judgment . . . "

Any determination made by

the clerk was reviewable by the court upon a request by either
party made within five days of the entry of the judgment.
The district court clerk has in fact entered Wright's
cost bill on the judgment docket pursuant to Rule 34(d), R. Utah
Ct. App.4
POINT III
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO REDUCE THE
ATTORNEY FEES AWARDED HUMPHRIES AT TRIAL.
This Court was fully aware of the fact that the issue of
attorney fees had been submitted to the jury. The opinion clearly
reflects an awareness of the fact that the district court had not
made the initial determination5.

Nevertheless, the district court

was instructed to reexamine the issue of attorney fees in light of
the decision on appeal.
The Court of Appeals did not instruct, encourage, or
expect the district court to divine the basis of the jury's
findings.

The task presented to the district court on remand had

Note the docketing notation on the original bill of coats located at R.
14-15 and reproduced here as Addendum C
5

Footnote 11 of the appellate opinion reads:
The jury instruction regarding attorney fees was broder than
the provisions in the Purchase Agreement which only provided
for recovery of fees to the prevailing party who was
"enforcing performance of any covenant or representation
hereunder or for damage for breach thereof." The instruction
given allowed the jury to award fees to the party who
prevailed in the action.
Neither party object€»d to this
instruction and both thereby acquiesced in the instruction as
given. Nor did either party object to having the jury make
the attorney fee decision, a matter ordinarily better
entrusted to the court.

9

nothing to do with the reconstruction of the jury's decision-making
process.

The jury concluded that $10,000 was a reasonable fee to

be awarded Humphries in connection with the prosecution of all the
claims presented. Such was the scope of the instructions given the
jury.

In terms of dollars and cents, only approximately one-third

of Humphries' claim survived the appeal.
The district court was presented ample evidence upon
which a reasonable reduction of Humphries' attorney fees could and
should have been made. In light of the substantial modification of
the judgment on appeal, the district court erred in refusing to
make any modification.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing it is respectfully submitted that
the order of the district court striking Wright's cost bill must be
reversed and said bill reinstated as a judgment. Furthermore, the
district court's order refusing to modify the attorney fees awarded
at trial should be reversed and this Court should specify the
extent of any such reduction.
DATED this

day of June, 1990.

Gary W. Pendleton
Attorney for Appellant

10

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I do hereby certify that on this
day of June, 1990,
I did personally mail four true and correct copies of the above and
foregoing Brief to Hans Q. Chamberlain, Attorney for Defendant at
250 South Main, P. 0. Box 726, Cedar City, Utah 84720.
Gary W. Pendleton
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the judgment to the extent that the district court had required
Plaintiff to reimburse Defendant Humphries certain funds deposited
directly into the Westside Nursery account, affirmed the judgment
to the extent that the Court had denied Humphries damages for
wrongful termination, reversed the judgment to the extent that the
district court had refused to exonerate the preliminary injunction
bond and remanded the case for the purpose of assessing Plaintiff's
attorney fees reasonably incurred on appeal and considering a
reduction of the attorney fees awarded Defendants at trial.
On remand, the district court assessed attorney fees
against Defendants but refused to reduce the attorney fees awarded
Defendants at trial and ordered Plaintiff's bill of costs on appeal
stricken.

From that order, Plaintiff prosecutes this second

appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Did the district court err in interpreting this
Court's opinion as denying Plaintiff's costs on appeal and in
ordering Plaintiff's bill of costs stricken?
2. Did the district court err in refusing to modify the
attorney fees awarded Humphries at trial?
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The text of all relevant authorities is quoted in the
body of this brief.

Additionally,

the text of proposed Rule 34,

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, together with the advisory
committee's note are included as Addendum A.
2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The prior appeal was decided on February 2, 1990, and is
reported at 127 Utah Adv. Rep. 21, 787 P.2d 508.
opinion is attached as Addendum B.

A copy of that

References to the language of

the opinion are located by citing the reporters.
For the sake of clarity and continuity, the Appellant is
referred

to

hereinafter

as

"Wright"

and

the

Appellees, as

"Humphries."
On the prior appeal, the principal issues Wright raised
related to fraudulent misrepresentation, repayment of funds which
Humphries had deposited into the Westside Nursery account and the
exoneration of a preliminary injunction bond.
On cross-appeal, Humphries sought the entry of a judgment
for wrongful termination of his employment contract, additional
interest and attorney fees on his "indemnification" claim, and
prejudgment interest on the fraud claim.
Wright prevailed on every issue presented on the appeal
with the exception of the issue relating to the repayment of funds
deposited into the nursery account.

Humphries was denied any

relief on his cross-appeal.
This Court ultimately reduced Humphries' net judgment
(excluding

attorney

fees)

from

Accordingly, the Court concluded:

$58,780.21

to

$20,180.00.

"[S]ome adjustment may be

necessary so that [Humphries] does not recover [ctttorney] fees
attributable to issues on which he did not prevail." 127 Utah Adv.
Rep. at 27, 787 P.2d at 517.
3

Finally, this Court concluded that Wright was "properly
regarded as the party who prevailed on appeal and 'is entitled on
remand to an award of [his] attorney fees reasonably incurred on
appeal.'" 127 Utah Adv. Rep. at 27, 787 P.2d at 517.
The remittitur was docketed in the district court on
March 6, 1990 (R 1).

On March 7, Wright filed his bill of costs

and mailed a photocopy thereof to Humphries' attorney on the same
day (R 14-15).
Wright simultaneously

filed a motion to reduce the

attorney fees awarded Humphries at trial and to assess against
Humphries the attorney fees which Wright reasonably incurred on
appeal (R 12-13, 16-17).
(R 18-19).

That motion was heard on March 21, 1990

At the hearing, Humphries verbally, and for the first

time, voiced an objection to the bill of costs.
As the hearing proceeded, Wright's counsel testified that
fully 90% of his fee was attributable to the defense of the fraud
claim which Humphries had asserted against Wright (T 6).

On the

other hand, Humphries' counsel stated that only approximately 20%
of his time was related to the fraud issue (T 19). He expressed no
opinion regarding the amount of time expended in connection with
the

wrongful

termination

claim

which

failed

in

post-trial

proceedings and ultimately on Humphries' cross-appeal (T 19-20).
Wright's counsel, in testimony, suggested an adjustment
based upon the 66% reduction on the judgment mandated by the Court
of Appeals as a reasonable basis for reducing the attorney fees
awarded Humphries at trial (T 7).
4

Humphries' counsel suggested that inasmuch as the jury
had not awarded him all of the attorney fees he had sought, the
jury had already made an appropriate adjustment in Humphries'
attorney fees (T 16).
Because it was impossible to divine the basis of the jury
award of attorney fees and determine how much of the award was
attributable to issues upon which Humphries did not ultimately
prevail, the district court refused to make any adjustment of the
award (T 24-26; R 20-23; See Addendum D ) .
Finally, the district court ordered Wright's bill of
costs stricken (R 21) because the opinion of "the Court of Appeals
doesn't mention costs" (T 24).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Wright was specifically identified as "the party who
prevailed on appeal" and is under prevailing rules and precedents,
entitled to the costs he incurred on the prior appeal.
The district court was presented ample evidence upon
which it could have made a reasonable reduction of the attorney
fees awarded Humphries at trial.

In light of the substantial

modification of the judgment on appeal, the district court esrred in
refusing to make any modification of Humphries' attorney fees.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
WRIGHT WAS ENTITLED TO AND AWARDED COSTS ON THE
PRIOR APPEAL.
On the prior appeal this Court concluded that Wright was
5

"properly regarded as the party who prevailed on appeal and 'is
entitled on remand to an award of [his] attorney fees reasonably
incurred on appeal.'"
Rule 34, R.Utah Ct.App.f effective at the time of the
decision on the prior appeal, provided in relevant part:
(a) To whom awarded. Except as otherwise provided
by law, if an appeal is dismissed, costs shall be
taxed against the appellant unless otherwise agreed
by the parties or ordered by the court; if a
judgment or order is affirmed, costs shall be taxed
against the appellant unless otherwise ordered; if
a judgment or order is reversed, costs shall be
taxed against the respondent unless otherwise
ordered; if a judgment or order is affirmed or
reversed in part, or is vacated, costs shall be
allowed as ordered by the court.
Paragraph (c) then enumerates the items taxable as costs
"in favor of the prevailing party in the appeal" and paragraph (d)
mentions "the cost bill of the prevailing party."
When the new rules of appellate practice were proposed in
1984, the language of proposed Rule 34 was substantially the same
as that quoted above.

The Advisory Committee Note1 regarding

Paragraph (a) stated:
This Paragraph provides that the prevailing party
shall generally be awarded costs, unless the
Supreme Court orders otherwise.
It is not
anticipated that the written opinion of the Supreme
Court will, after adoption of this rule,
specifically award costs unless there is a
departure from the general rule.
In delivering its opinion this Court took time to analyze
the numerous issues presented on appeal and cross-appeal concluded
^•Attached Addendum A is a reproduction of Rule 34 as proposed in 1984,
together with the Advisory Committee Note. When the Court of Appeals was later
created, Rule 34 was adopted as a rule of this Court with only minor changes.
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that Wright was "the party who prevailed on appeal" and ordered the
district court to award him attorney fees reasonably incurred on
the appeal.
The designation of Wright as "the party who prevailed on
appeal" and the award of attorney fees are incongruous with the
district court's conclusion that Wright is not entitled to the
costs incurred on the appeal.2
In Everts v. Worrell, 58 Utah 238, 197 P. 1043 (1921),
Everts won the reversal of a judgment in favor of Worrell.

The

Utah Supreme Court's opinion concluded with the following;
Judgment is therefore reversed, and the causes
remanded to the district court of Weber county,
with directions to grant Plaintiff a new trial at
defendant's cost.
On remand the district court refused to allow Everts to
enforce a judgment for costs against Worrell, interpreting the
language of the Supreme Court opinion to apply only to costs
incident to the new trial and not to costs on appeal.

On Everts'

application for writ of mandate, Everts v. Barker, 58 Utah 519, 200

2

In reciting the basis of its decision, the district court stated:
[BY THE COURT] In reviewing the opinion in this case, the
Court of Appeals doesn't mention costs.
I don't know if
that's because no application was made for costs before the
Court of Appeals, or because the issue just wasn't considered.
But whatever the reason, the Court of Appeals, in fact, did
not award Mr. Wright his costs.
Going strictly by the language of Rule 34, I have to conclude,
therefore, that this Court is without jurisdiction to make any
determination on the applicability or the award of costs as
requested by Mr. Wright. That's an issue that should have
been raised and decided upon before the Court of Appeals.
Therefore, the request for an award of costs is denied.

T. 24.
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P. 473 (1921), the Supreme Court held that the language of an
appellate opinion must be construed in light of the circumstances
of the case and prevailing rules of practice and precedents.

An

opinion must not be construed so as to result in an absurdity. The
writ was issued.3
Wright incurred an expense of nearly $3,000 in merely
having a transcript of the trial proceedings prepared for review on
appeal.

A construction of the appellate opinion denying Wright

costs will effectively impose upon him all of the costs associated
with marshalling the evidence on an appeal in which he prevailed.
The order of the district court must be reversed and
Wright's bill of costs reinstated and enforced as a judgment.
POINT II
HUMPHRIES HAS WAIVED ANY OBJECTION TO WRIGHT'S BILL
OF COSTS BY HIS FAILURE TO OBJECT THERETO.
Under Rule 3 4 ( d ) , R.Utah C t . A p p . , any o b j e c t i o n t o a b i l l
of c o s t s
bill,

had t o be f i l e d w i t h i n f i v e days o f t h e s e r v i c e o f

t o g e t h e r w i t h a m o t i o n t o have t h e c o s t s t a x e d by t h e c o u r t .

"If t h e r e i s no o b j e c t i o n t o t h e b i l l o f c o s t s w i t h i n t h e
time,

the clerk

of

that

court

shall

tax the costs

e n t e r judgment f o r t h e p a r t y e n t i t l e d t h e r e t o * * *
bill

the

of

the prevailing party i s

t i m e l y opposed,

as

allotted
filed

and

If the

cost

the clerk,

upon

Uncertain about the appropriate means of procuring enforcement of t h i s
Court's p r i o r d e c i s i o n and review of the d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s orders on remand,
Wright w i l l simultaneously p e t i t i o n t h i s Court for writ in the form of mandate.
In some j u r i s d i c t i o n s c o s t s are taxed by the c l e r k of the a p p e l l a t e court and any
o b j e c t i o n t o t h e Clerk's determination i s considered d i r e c t l y by t h e a p p e l l a t e
c o u r t . See Family Medical Bldq. v. S t a t e , D . S . H . S . , 38 Wash.App. 738, 689 P.2d
413 (1984).
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reasonable notice and hearing, shall tax the costs and enter a
final determination and judgment . . . "

Any determination made by

the clerk was reviewable by the court upon a request by either
party made within five days of the entry of the judgment.
The district court clerk has in fact entered Wright's
cost bill on the judgment docket pursuant to Rule 34(d), R. Utah
Ct. App.4
POINT III
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO REDUCE THE
ATTORNEY FEES AWARDED HUMPHRIES AT TRIAL.
This Court was fully aware of the fact that the issue of
attorney fees had been submitted to the jury. The opinion clearly
reflects an awareness of the fact that the district court had not
made the initial determination5.

Nevertheless, the district court

was instructed to reexamine the issue of attorney fees in light of
the decision on appeal.
The Court of Appeals did not instruct, encourage, or
expect the district court to divine the basis of the jury's
findings.

The task presented to the district court on remand had

Note the docketing notation on the original bill of costs located at R.
14-15 and reproduced here as Addendum C
5

Footnote 11 of the appellate opinion reads:
The jury instruction regarding attorney fees was broder than
the provisions in the Purchase Agreement which only provided
for recovery of fees to the prevailing party who was
"enforcing performance of any covenant or representation
hereunder or for damage for breach thereof." The instruction
given allowed the jury to award fees to the party who
prevailed in the action.
Neither party objected to this
instruction and both thereby acquiesced in the instruction as
given. Nor did either party object to having thcs jury make
the attorney fee decision, a matter ordinarily better
entrusted to the court.
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nothing to do with the reconstruction of the jury's decision-making
process•

The jury concluded that $10,000 was a reasonable fee to

be awarded Humphries in connection with the prosecution of all the
claims presented. Such was the scope of the instructions given the
jury.

In terms of dollars and cents, only approximately one-third

of Humphries' claim survived the appeal.
The district court was presented ample evidence upon
which a reasonable reduction of Humphries' attorney fees could and
should have been made. In light of the substantial modification of
the judgment on appeal, the district court erred in refusing to
make any modification.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing it is respectfully submitted that
the order of the district court striking Wright's cost bill must be
reversed and said bill reinstated as a judgment. Furthermore, the
district court's order refusing to modify the attorney fees awarded
at trial should be reversed and this Court should specify the
extent of any such reduction.
DATED this

(p

day of JunQ,- 1990.

/s/
Gary W. Pendleton
Attorney for Appellant
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jii
Gary W. Pendleton
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12-18-84
Rule 34.
(a)

AWARD OF COSTS.
To Whom Allowed.

Except as otherwise provided by law,

if an appeal is dismissed, costs shall be taxed against the appellant unless otherwise agreed by the parties or ordered by the
Court; if a judgment or order is affirmed, costs shall be taxed
against appellant unless otherwise ordered; if a judgment or order
is reversed, costs shall be taxed against the respondent unless
otherwise ordered; if a judgment or order is affirmed or reversed
in part, or is vacated, costs shall be allowed as ordered by the
Court.

Costs shall not be allowed or taxed in a criminal case.

(b)

Costs for and Against the State of Utah.

In cases in-

volving the State of Utah or an agency or officer thereof, an
award of costs for or against the State shall be at the discretion of the Court unless specifically required or prohibited by
law.
(c)

Costs of Briefs and Attachments, Record, Bonds and Other

Expenses on Appeal.

The following may be taxed as costs in favor

of the prevailing party in the appeal:

The actual costs of a

*^^

printed or typewritten brief and attachments not to exceed $3.00 , IK
for each page; actual costs incurred in the preparation and trans-^T
mission of the record including costs of the reporter's transcript^
unless otherwise ordered by the Court; premiums paid for supersedeas or cost bonds to preserve rights pending appeal; and the
fees for filing and docketing the appeal.
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(d)

Bill of Costs Taxed After Remittitur.

When costs are

awarded to a party in an appeal from a lower court, a party
claiming costs shall, within 15 days after the remittitur is filed
with the clerk of the court below, serve upon the adverse party
'and file with the clerk of the court an itemized and verified
bill of costs.
//
^)
' !L0tX

The adverse party may, within 5 days of service

of the bill of costs, serve and file a notice of objection
together with a motion to have the costs taxed by the court
below.

If there is no objection to the cost bill within the

P.

w"

alloted time, the clerk of the court shall tax the costs as filed
and enter judgment for the party entitled thereto, which judgment
shall be entered in the judgment docket with the same force and
effect as in the case of other judgments-of record.

If the cost

bill of the prevailing party is timely opposed, the clerk, upon
reasonable notice and hearing, shall tax the costs and enter a
final determination and judgment which shall thereupon be entered
in the judgment docket with the same force and effect as in the
case of other judgments of record.

The determination of the

clerk shall be reviewable by the district court upon the request
of either party made within 5 days of the entry of the judgment.
(e)

Costs in Other Proceedings and Agency Appeals.

In all other matters before the Court, including appeals from
an agency, costs may be allowed as in cases on appeal from a lower
court.

Within 15 days after the expiration of the time in which
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a petition for rehearing may be filed or within 15 days after
an order denying such a petition, the party to whom costs have
been awarded may file with the Clerk of the Court and serve upon
the adverse party an itemized and verified bill of costs.

The

adverse party may, within 5 days after the service of the bill
of costs file a notice of objection and a motion to have the costs
taxed by the Clerk.

If no objection to the cost bill is filed

within the alloted time, the Clerk shall thereupon tax the costs
and enter judgment against the adverse party.

If the adverse

party timely objects to the cost bill, the Clerk, upon reasonable
notice and hearing, shall determine and settle the costs, tax
the same, and a judgment shall be entered thereon against the
adverse party.

The determination by the Clerk shall be reviewable

by the Court upon the request of either party made within 5 days
of the entry of judgment; unless otherwise ordered, oral argument
shall not be permitted.

A judgment under this section may be

filed with the clerk of any district court in the State who shall
docket a ceritifed copy of the same in the manner and with the
same force and effect as judgments of the district court.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE
This Rule is a substantial departure from current practice and
rules.
Paragraph (a). This Paragraph provides that the prevailing party
shall generally be awarded costs, unless the Supreme Court orders otherwise. It is not anticipated that written opinions of the Supreme Court
will, after adoption of this Rule, specifically award costs unless
there is a departure from the general rule.

Ill

Paragraph (b). Prior practice under Rule 54(d)(1) allowed costs
against the State, its officers and agencies only to the extent allowed
by law. Rule 33 modifies that concept to allow costs either for or
against the State of Utah, its officers and/or agencies under the theory
that if the State can recover costs, it should also be subject to costs
at the discretion of the Court, unless specifically prohibited by law.
Paragraph (c). The paragraph sets forth with particularity what
costs are recoverable, and raises the allowable costs for each page
of the original brief to 53.00 per page from $2,00 per page under prior
Rule 75(p)(5) URCivP. The words "actual costs" in the paragraph ensure
that parties only seek actual costs where the actual costs are less
than $3.00 per page.
Paragraph (d). This paragraph deals with costs on appeal from
lower courts. The rule differs substantially from prior Rule 54(d)(3)
URCivP in that costs are taxed, if an objection is timely made, by
the district court clerk. It is not anticipated that the district
court would be involved in taxing costs unless a party objects to the
district court clerk's taxation of costs. The costs taxed by the district court will automatically be docketed as a judgment without the
necessity of a formal motion to enter a judgment for costs. The rule
is self-enforcing, and a party desiring to recover costs must make
a timely filing in the district court or costs are waived.
ParaGraph (e). This paragraph deals with awarding costs in proceedings other than appeals from district courts, such as original
proceedings and agency appeals. Costs and the taxing of costs are
handled by the Clerk of the Supreme Court in the same manner as prescribed for the clerk of the district court under paragraph (d) of
this rule, including a review without oral argument by the Supreme
Court if proper application is filed. A judgment for costs in the
Supreme Court may be filed and docketed with any district court in
the State of Utah with the same force and effect as a judgment entered
by the district court.
The provisions of Rule 54(d)(3) and (4) URCivP dealing with the
assessment and taxing of costs en appeal and in original proceedings
before the Supreme Court are repealed as of the effective date of these
Rules.
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ORME, Judge:
Plaintiff George Wright ("Wright") appeals from several
adverse rulings made during the course of trial in this
complicated case. Defendants Westside Nursery and Darrel
Humphries ("Humphries") cross-appeal from two postjudgment
rulings in the same case. We affirm in part, reverse in part,
vacate in part, and remand to the trial court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The numerous issues raised on appeal require, regrettably, a
somewhat laborious presentation of the facts. Except where the
discrepancies are identified, the facts as set forth are
essentially undisputed.

PRETRIAL FACTS
Humphries was general partner and manager of Westside
Nursery located in St. George, Utah. In 1985, Wright contracted
with Westside Nursery to landscape his residence in St. George.
During this time, Wright and Humphries began to discuss the
possibility of Wright purchasing the nursery. At some point in
the negotiations, the parties agreed Wright would exchange real
estate for the nursery.
In August 1985, Humphries flew to Ogden, Weber County, where
Wright owned several acres of land, and stayed the night in
Wright's home. There was conflicting evidence about whether the
parties were contemplating the property exchange at this time and
about whether Humphries viewed the property during this visit.
In October 1985, Humphries and his wife traveled to the
Ogden area. On October 4th, the parties spent several hours
reviewing and revising two agreements which had been previously
drafted by Wright's attorney. The first agreement, the Agreement
for Purchase of Assets ("Purchase Agreement"), concerned the
exchange of the property for the nursery. The second, the
Contract for Management Services ("Management Agreement"),
concerned Wright's employment of Humphries as nursery manager.
The agreements were signed and deeds were executed conveying the
Weber County property to Humphries.
Although Humphries inspected the property on the same day
that the contracts were executed, the parties disagree on whether
he saw it before or after the execution. Humphries testified
that he saw it only afterward. While showing Mr. and Mrs.
Humphries the property, Wright identified several surrounding
parcels of property and the range of prices for which they had
been purchased. He also pointed out that there was no sewer
currently servicing the area, but informed Humphries that he
expected one to be installed within a year and a half. No
evidence was admitted to suggest that any of this information was
false. Moreover, the sewer was in fact installed within two
years.
Humphries' position throughout the trial was that Wright had
represented the Weber County property as being worth at least
$90,000. He alleged that Wright told him this on October 4th
when they went to see the property. Wright consistently
maintained that the property was indeed worth $90,000, but denied
ever having made this representation prior to executing the
contracts.

nnn*kAA-rA
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Wright admitted during the trial that he did not know the
exact value of the property. There was no evidence to suggest
that an appraisal had ever been made of the property prior to
this litigation. However, Wright did testify about the selling
price of similar properties in the surrounding area. Moreover,
he introduced evidence that the property was valued at
approximately $104,000 for tax purposes. The parties each
introduced expert testimony concerning the value of the property
as of when the transaction was finalized. The appraisals covered
a wide range, from $35,000 to $84,000. Humphries testified that
he sold the property for $54,700, to a neighboring landowner, a
few days before trial.
Meanwhile, on October 15, 1985, only a few days after the
transaction closed, the Weber County Commission declared a
limited moratorium on the area which contained the subject parcel
of land. The moratorium prevented owners from building
subdivisions on the affected land without approval from the
commission. Evidence was introduced demonstrating that Wright
knew of the potential for this moratorium before the October 4th
closing but did not disclose the possibility to Humphries.
However, Wright introduced unrebutted evidence he had spoken to
several governmental officials about the potential moratorium and
that they had led him to believe the moratorium would probably
not be declared and that, if it were, his property would probably
receive approval for development anyway.
After execution of the contracts and before the end of
November 1985, Humphries claims he heard rumors that the Weber
County Property might not be worth $90,000. He then made some
inquiries and determined that he had been defrauded. On December
10, 1985, Humphries* attorney wrote a letter to Wright expressing
his suspicions and proposing to settle the dispute. On December
18, the attorney wrote a second letter informing Wright that
Humphries considered the Purchase Agreement cancelled and
rescinded.
On December 23, Wright initiated an action to determine the
ownership of the nursery. On the same day, the trial court
issued a temporary restraining order which prohibited Humphries
from doing anything with the nursery inconsistent with Wright's
ownership and prevented him from incurring further debt on behalf
of Wright or the nursery.
From October 1985 through March 1986, Humphries managed the
nursery pursuant to the Management Agreement and drew a salary of
$2,500 per month. Prior to the sale of the nursery to Wright,
Humphries had obtained a $15,000 loan from Zions Bank which he
remained obligated to pay under the Purchase Agreement.
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Subsequent to the sale, Humphries signed a second promissory note
for $30,000 in favor of Zions Bank. He drew $15,000 against the
note on December 13, 1985, prior to the December 23 restraining
order. On December 30, he drew an additional $5,000 on the note,
and the remaining $10,000 on January 6, 1986. The entire $30,000
was, at least initially, deposited into the nursery account.
In March 1986, Wright sought possession of the nursery. The
trial court ordered Humphries to relinquish his possession of the
nursery to Wright, imposed various duties on the parties, and
appointed a receiver to assist the court in monitoring the
business and the parties' compliance with its order. As a
condition to issuance of this second temporary restraining
order,1 the court ordered Wright to procure a $50,000
injunction bond. Wright did so. He then discharged Humphries
and took possession of the nursery.
LITIGATION FACTS
As indicated, Wright filed a complaint against Humphries in
December 1985. In due course, Humphries answered the complaint
and raised various counterclaims. On September 17, 1986, a
hearing was held concerning several pending motions. Most
significantly, the district court found that Humphries had waived
his right to seek rescission of the contract and that adequate
remedies existed at law. Therefore, the court dismissed
Humphries' claim for rescission with prejudice.
The balance of the dispute was tried to a jury in April
1988, and trial took five days to complete. Wright attempted to
establish that Humphries had breached the contracts by
misappropriating nursery money for his own use and borrowing
funds from Zions Bank without authorization and therefore should
not be reimbursed for any of those monies. Humphries attempted
to establish that Wright had induced him to enter into the
contract by fraudulently misrepresenting the value of the
property. He also introduced evidence to suggest that Wright had
tortiously failed to disclose the potential moratorium, although
the jury was never instructed regarding fraudulent omission.
Both parties argued for attorney fees and Humphries introduced
evidence that he had incurred over $30,000 in attorney fees and

1. Although captioned as a temporary restraining order, the
March order giving Wright possession of the nursery was
procedurally, and in substance, a preliminary injunction.
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costs. The case was submitted to the jury for special verdicts
in accordance with Utah R. Civ. P. 49(a) .
The jury returned the following special verdicts:
(1) Humphries breached the agreements between the parties and as
a result should pay Wright $6,805; (2) Wright breached the
agreements by terminating Humphries and should pay Humphries
$15,000; (3) Wright breached the agreements in other respects but
no damages resulted; (4) Wright should pay up to $5,000 in
accounts payable existing prior to the transaction; (5) Humphries
should pay such accounts beyond $5,000; (6) Humphries should
receive the accounts receivable prior to October 4, 1985;
(7) Humphries should pay the $15,000 loan acquired prior to
October 4, 1985; (8) Wright should pay the $30,000 loan acquired
after October 4, 1985, with interest; (9) Wright made fraudulent
misrepresentations about the value of the property and should pay
Humphries $38,582 in damages; (10) Wright should pay Humphries
$10,000 in attorney fees.
The foreman of the jury was questioned by the court
concerning the $6,805 award for Humphries' breach of the
contracts. The foreman explained that the amount represented
various payments Humphries had made out of the nursery account
which the jury found he misappropriated to his own use.
After the trial, Wright moved for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict and for the court to exonerate the injunction bond.
The court denied the motions. It did, however, deny the $15,000
award to Humphries because the court found as a matter of law
that Humphries had been properly terminated given the jury
finding he misappropriated nursery funds. In its judgment on the
verdict, the court affirmed all of its previous orders including
the two restraining orders. In total, it awarded Humphries a
judgment of $68,780.21, to bear interest at the legal rate until
paid in full.
Most of the net award to Humphries came directly from the
special verdict. However, $20,198.21 of the award bears some
additional explanation. The jury found that Wright was obligated
to pay the $30,000 loan from Zions Bank plus interest which had
accrued as of the date of trial. The interest amounted to
approximately $7,000. From the $37,000 total, the court
subtracted approximately $17,000. This amount represented the
nursery account monies that Humphries had misappropriated to
himself, as found by the jury, and additional sums paid for
legitimate nursery expenses for which Humphries was liable under
the jury's verdict. In essence, the court did not agree with the

jury that Wright was actually liable for the $30,000 loan.
Instead, the court held that Wright was obligated to reimburse
Humphries for that portion of the $30,000 loan which made its way
into the nursery account and was used to pay obligations for
which Wright was ultimately responsible.
On appeal, Wright makes the following arguments:
(1) Humphries failed to prove a prima facie case of fraudulent
misrepresentation; (2) the jury determination of the value of th e
real property at the time of the transaction was unsupported by
the evidence; (3) the evidence was insufficient to demonstrate
that Wright should indemnify Humphries for the $30,000 loan fr:om
Zions Bank; (4) Humphries was not entitled to attorney fees; and
(5) the district court erred in failing to exonerate the
injunction bond. Humphries cross-appeals and makes the following
arguments: (1) The district court erred in dismissing the
$15,000 jury award for Humphries' wrongful termination; (2) the
district court erred in failing to award prejudgment interest o
on
the $38,582 fraud award; and (3) this court should direct the
trial court to amend its judgment to include postjudgment
interest, costs, and attorney fees on the part of the judgment
premised on Wright's obligation to pay most of the amount
attributable to the $30,000 note. We will discuss each of these
claims.
FRAUD
Wright argues on appeal that the jury did not have
sufficient evidence upon which to base its verdict of fraud. We
of course consider the evidence in a light favorable to the
verdict and "we will not substitute our judgment for that of the
jury where the verdict is supported by substantial and competent
evidence." Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766, 769 (Utah 1985).
Moreover, Wright's duty on appeal is to "marshal all the evidence
supporting the verdict and demonstrate that, even viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to that verdict, the
evidence is insufficient to support it." £&. (citing Scharf v.
BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985)). With this standard
of review in mind, we note that Wright's marshaling of the
evidence is adequate to permit our consideration of this
issue.2
2. Wright beseeches us to make a thorough review of the whole
record, which fills a box the size of an orange crate. We do not
apologize for declining Wright's invitation. The very purpose of

At trial, Humphries had the burden to prove all the
essential elements of the fraud claim. Pace v. Parish, 122
Utah 141, 247 P.2d 273, 274 (1952). Although both parties
address two fraud theories on appeal—fraudulent
misrepresentation concerning the value of the property and
fraudulent concealment of the building moratorium—the jury was
only instructed regarding the first theory* We cannot affirm
the verdict based upon a theory which was not presented to the
jury for consideration. Consequently, Humphries may only
prevail if he sustained his burden of proving each element of
the fraudulent misrepresentation claim. He failed to meet this
burden.
The elements of a fraudulent misrepresentation claim are:
(1) That a representation was made; (2)
concerning a presently existing material
fact; (3) which was false; (4) which the
representor either (a) knew to be false,
or (b) made recklessly, knowing that he
had insufficient knowledge upon which to
base such representation; (5) for the
purpose of inducing the other party to act
upon it; (6) that the other party, acting
reasonably and in ignorance of its
falsity; (7) did in fact rely upon it; (8)
and was thereby induced to act; (9) to his
injury and damage.
Pace, 247 P.2d at 274-75. Distilling the argument somewhat,
Wright basically argues that the evidence was insufficient to
support elements 2 (material fact) and 4 (mental state).
Because the representation of value, if made, was a matter of
opinion and not of fact, we need not address the sufficiency of
the evidence regarding Wright's state of mind.

(footnote 2 continued)
such devices as the "marshaling" doctrine and R. Utah Ct. App.
24(a)(7), requiring that all references in briefs to factual
matters "be supported by citations to the record," is to spare
appellate courts such an onerous burden. Absent exceptional
circumstances, our review of the record is limited to those
specific portions of the record which have been drawn to our
attention by the parties and which are relevant to the legal
questions properly before us.

Humphries alleged at trial that Wright had falsely
represented the value of the Weber County property. However,
"misrepresentations as to value do not ordinarily constitute
fraud, as they are regarded as mere expressions of opinion or
•trader's talk1 involving matter of judgment and estimation as
to which men may differ," Baird v. Eflow Inv. Co., 7 6 Utah 232,
289 P. 112, 114 (1930). &e£ also Frazier v. Southwest Sav. &
Loan Ass'n, 134 Ariz. 12, 653 P.2d 362, 365 (Ct. App. 1982)
("Mere representations as to value are generally considered
expressions of opinion and will not support a claim for
fraud."); Poison Co. v. Imperial Cattle Co., 624 P.2d 993, 996
(Mont. 1981) ("Statements as to the value of property are
generally considered declarations of opinion. . . . " ) ; Davis v.
Schiess, 417 P.2d 19, 21 (Wyo. 1966) ("[A]n expression of
opinion as to value is not fraud."). Indeed, the jury was
instructed to this effect.3
Although usually opinion, expressions of value have
occasionally been regarded as fraudulent misrepresentations of
fact. Mostly, parties have prevailed when they have offered
"substantial evidence to show bad faith or to show the
expression of value was not [the owner's] real opinion." Davis.
417 P.2d at 21. See also Baird, 289 P. at 114 (listing examples
of the kinds of bad faith indicia which demonstrate that the
representation is not a bona fide opinion). 4 In this case,
however, the record is devoid of any evidence of this kind.
In his brief, Humphries points to three facts which he
believes demonstrate that the representation of value was made
3. Jury Instruction No. 26 included this statement: "The value
of property is subjective. It is a matter of opinion."
4. When an owner's opinion of value is the basis of the
fraudulent misrepresentation claim, courts are primarily
concerned with whether or not the stated value was in fact the
owner's actual opinion. In a sense, these cases do not really
represent exceptions to the usual rule that the operative
misrepresentation be of a presently existing fact. Rather, the
owner implicitly represents a fact when he gives his opinion,
namely that he presently holds the opinion he is giving. If the
stated value is truly the owner's opinion then the buyer may not
base his or her fraud claim on that opinion, regardless of the
accuracy of the opinion. On the other hand, if the evidence
suggests that the stated value was not the owner's true opinion,
this fact may be the basis of a fraudulent misrepresentation
claim.
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in bad faith and was not Wright's honest opinion: (1) Wright
did not know the actual value of the property when he made the
statement because the property had not been appraised; (2)
Wright referred to the selling price of other properties in the
development when he allegedly gave Humphries his estimate; (3)
Wright failed to disclose the potential building moratorium. We
will discuss each of these facts.
The fact that the property had not been appraised before
Wright made his representation does not support Humphries'
argument. The law does not require a landowner to obtain an
appraisal before he or she can state an opinion about the value
of his or her land.5
Humphries may not prevail under his second argument, i.e.,
that Wright made reference to the price of other similar
properties. Initially, it is difficult to see how Humphries can
seriously make this argument. His own position at trial was
that he signed the contract before Wright took him to view the
property and made reference to the surrounding properties. How,
then, could these statements about the value of adjacent
property have been relied on by Humphries in deciding bo enter
into the contract? Moreover, Humphries introduced no evidence
to suggest that any of the statements concerning the surrounding
properties were false in any way. There was simply no evidence
of bad faith concerning statements about the surrounding
properties from which the jury could have inferred that Wright's
representation was other than honest opinion.
Thirdly, Humphries argues that the failure to disclose the
potential moratorium evidenced bad faith and the disingenuousness
of Wright's opinion. The only fact to support this argument is
that Wright knew of the potential moratorium before the
transaction. However, the moratorium was placed on the property
after the transaction was formalized and Wright consistently
testified that public officials had encouraged his belief that
the moratorium, if imposed, would not be a problem—a conclusion
borne out by subsequent events. Although the depositions of

5. If an owner is competent to give evidence on the market
value of his property, as the jury was correctly instructed in
Jury Instruction No. 27, it is logical to assume that he may
competently give an opinion of the value v/ithout first obtaining
an appraisal. Otherwise, he would merely be passing along the
appraiser's opinion.
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these public officials had been taken prior to trial, Humphries
introduced no evidence to rebut Wright's testimony. Thus, there
was no substantial, competent evidence from which the jury could
have found Wright falsely stated his opinion as to the value of
the property because of what he knew about the potential
moratorium.°
In contrast to Humphries1 lack of evidence regarding bad
faith, Wright introduced evidence to show his good faith,
including the property tax assessment of $104,688 and his
unrebutted testimony that he knew of similar properties in the
area which had sold for comparable prices.
We conclude our discussion of the fraud issue with the
observation that while the
law provides reasonable protection to
purchasers against fraud and deceit[,] . . .
it does not go to the romantic length of
offering indemnity against the adverse
consequences of folly and indolence or a
careless indifference to information which
would enlighten the purchaser as to the
truth or falsity of the seller's assertions
as to value.
Poison, 624 P.2d at 996. The record does not disclose any
reason, other than his own blind reliance upon Wright's
representations, why Humphries chose to formalize the
transaction prior—at least as he recalled—to even viewing the
property, much less making independent inquiry or obtaining his
own appraisal. "It is reasonable to expect that . . . vendors
would attach the highest possible value to the property.
Indeed, it would be unreasonable to assume otherwise, and
purchasers who rely on such representations proceed at their own
risk." M . at 997. See also Pace, 247 P.2d at 275
("[P]laintiffs did not use reasonable care and diligence [and]

6. As noted previously in this opinion, Humphries failed to
have the jury instructed on a fraudulent omission claim. Had
the jury been instructed under this alternative theory, we would
be more inclined to affirm the verdict based upon Wright's
failure to inform Humphries of the potential moratorium.
However, in the context of a fraudulent misrepresentation claim
premised on a statement of value, the mere omission of the
moratorium information bears little weight given the record
before us.
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were, therefore, not entitled to rely on
. . . . ••); Baird, 289 P. at 114 ("There
defendants to prevent the plaintiff from
inquiry and investigation concerning the
apartments.") .

the representation
was nothing done by the
making the fullest
value of the

In the absence of substantial and competent evidence of
bad faith on Wright's part, we must reverse the fraud
verdict. 7
"INDEMNIFICATION"
Wright argues that there was insufficient evidence for the
jury verdict requiring him to "indemnify" Humphries for the
$30,000 loan from Zions Bank. As noted in the Eoregoing
section, when an appellant challenges the sufficiency of
evidence, his duty on appeal is to "marshal all the evidence
supporting the verdict and demonstrate that, even viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to that verdict, the
evidence is insufficient to support it." Van Hake v. Thomas,
705 P.2d 766, 769 (Utah 1985) (citing Scharf, 700 P.2d at 1070).
Unlike his marshaling with respect to the fraud verdict,
Wright's marshaling of the evidence for this argument was
inadequate. He completely failed to identify and explain any
of the evidence supporting the jury verdict. See also note 2,
supra. On the other hand, Humphries refers us to numerous
facts from the record upon which the jury could have based its
verdict. We will not disturb the jury verdict where, as here,
appellant has completely failed to sustain his burden of
marshaling the evidence.
In addition to challenging the sufficiency of the
evidence, Wright argues that the jury was improperly instructed
regarding Humphries' burden to establish his right to
reimbursement of monies he expended in connection with the
nursery business. We have considered this argument and find it
to be without merit. The jury heard conflicting evidence about
whether Wright instructed or encouraged further indebtedness
and about the use of loan proceeds after they were placed in
the nursery account. We believe the jury could reasonably
conclude from the instructions given and evidence adduced that
7. Because we reverse the fraud verdict, we need not discuss
Wright's arguments that the jury improperly determined the
award for that claim or Humphries' claim that he was entitled
to prejudgment interest on the fraud award.

Humphries was entitled to reimbursement of the basic amounts
found due by the jury. Thus, we affirm as to the
"indemnification" issue.
POSTJUDGMENT INTEREST, COSTS AND FEES ON $30,000 AWARD
Humphries argues that Wright should be obligated to pay
all amounts which are incurred postjudgment in connection with
the $30,000 promissory note, including interest as set forth in
the note and any costs and attorney fees which he may incur as
a result of collection action taken on the note. We disagree.
The applicable special verdict regarding the $30,000 loan
from Zions Bank might have been more artfully phrased.
However, the court clearly and correctly concluded from the
jury's findings that Wright was obligated to pay that portion
of the borrowed $30,000 which was deposited into the nursery
account and legitimately used for nursery purposes for which
Wright, rather than Humphries, was properly chargeable. Thus,
in calculating a lump sum which Wright should pay to Humphries,
the court began with the $30,000 plus interest accrued as of
the date of trial. From this amount, the court subtracted
various sums which Humphries was obligated to pay either
because he had misappropriated funds or because he was properly
chargeable for them under the parties' arrangement.
Although the parties have argued in terms of
"indemnification" regarding the $30,000 loan, this terminology
is not altogether appropriate. The court did not anticipate an
ongoing relationship between the parties, or responsibility on
the part of Wright, as would have occurred with indemnification
in the technical sense. 8 Rather, the court anticipated and
implemented a clean break of the relationship through a lump
sum payment.

8. Had the court meant Wright to indemnify Humphries it would
have awarded only that amount which Humphries had paid on the
note as of the date of the judgment, perhaps accompanied with
declaratory relief to the effect that Wright should continue to
indemnify Humphries for any payments subsequently made. Under
this scenario, the payment of postjudgment interest at the
contract rate, as well as incurred attorney fees and costs,
would make sense, albeit on a prospective basis only.
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In effect, the court viewed the $30,000 as Humphries'
money which had been used in part for the operation of Wright's
nursery. The court did not require Wright to directly pay off
the note. Moreover, it only required Wright to pay to
Humphries that portion of the $30,000 which Humphries had used
for the nursery and for which Wright was responsible. Thus, we
believe the court correctly viewed payment of the note, per se,
as Humphries' obligation.9 The operative theory, then, was
more one of equitable reimbursement or accounting rather than
indemnification. Accordingly, Humphries was not: entitled to
postjudgment interest at higher than the legal rate, or costs
or attorney fees for which Humphries might eventually become
responsible if he chose to forego prompt repayment of the note
and his bank brought collection action.
EXONERATION OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION BOND
In March 1986, the trial court gave possession of the
nursery to Wright under an order captioned as a temporary
restraining order. But see note 1, supra. Wright was required
to post a preliminary injunction bond to compensate Humphries
in the event that the order was wrongfully entered. See Utah
R. Civ. P. 65A(c). Wright discharged Humphries, took
possession of the nursery, and retained control of the nursery
thereafter. The injunction and bond remained in effect until
the trial, following which the order was specifically affirmed
in the court's final judgment. After the trial on the merits,
Wright moved to exonerate the injunction bond. The court
denied Wright's motion, for reasons which do not appear in the
record before us. We hold that it was error for the court not
to exonerate the bond.
According to Rule 65A(c) of the Utah Rules
Procedure, the purpose of an injunction bond is
the payment of such costs and damages as may be
suffered by any party who is found to have been

of Civil
to provide "for
incurred or
wrongfully

9. This view is bolstered by a discussion between counsel and
the court which took place at a post-trial hearing on July 12,
1988. In that hearing the court emphasized the fact that there
was no evidence Wright had participated in the loan
negotiations or authorized Humphries to accept the bank's
terms. Thus, although Wright was obligated to reimburse most
of the amounts used for nursery purposes, Humphries was
exclusively obligated on the note.

enjoined or restrained." Id. (emphasis added). A right of
action on the bond does not arise until the court dissolves the
injunction or determines that the injunction should not have
been granted. 42 Am.Jur.2d Injunctions § 380 (1969). Moreover,
if it is finally determined that the injunction was proper, the
purpose for the bond has been achieved and it may be
exonerated. See id.
In a pretrial motion for summary judgment, Wright argued
that Humphries had waived his right to rescind the Purchase
Agreement. The court agreed and dismissed with prejudice
Humphries' claim for rescission and consequently his claim for
possession of the nursery, Humphries was apparently resigned to
that decision—he never sought its reconsideration, did not
contest it at trial, and has not appealed it—but rather pursued
his remedies at law. Moreover, he has never challenged the
validity of the injunction. After the trial on the merits, the
court affirmed its prior orders including the injunction. Once
final judgment was entered, the preliminary injunction
necessarily terminated. The injunction having terminated, the
court was bound to exonerate the bond upon proper motion and it
erred when it refused to do so.
WRONGFUL TERMINATION
In its special verdict, the jury concluded that Wright
terminated Humphries as an employee contrary to the terms of the
Management Agreement. It awarded Humphries $15,000. The court,
however, determined that Wright was justified in terminating
Humphries as a matter of law and dismissed the wrongful
termination claim. Humphries argues that the court abused its
discretion in dismissing this claim. We do not agree.
Following the trial and jury deliberations, the foreman
read the special verdicts. The trial judge, presumably to
clarify apparent conflict among the various awards, then
questioned him concerning certain of the damage awards. In
particular, the foreman was asked to explain the $6,805 awarded
to Wright for Humphries' breach of the agreements. His response
clearly indicated that the jury found Humphries had, on several
occasions prior to his termination, misappropriated funds from
the nursery for his own use and the award reflected those
misappropriations.
It is a basic tenet of agency law that "[a] principal is
privileged to discharge before the time fixed by the contract of

employment an agent who has committed such a violation of duty
that his conduct constitutes a material breach of contract."
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 409(1) (1958)- Humphries can
hardly argue that misappropriation of thousands of dolLars in
nursery funds was anything but a material breach of the
Management Agreement.
The jury foreman's more detailed responses to the effect
that Humphries had misappropriated funds were inconsistent with
the general conclusion that Wright had breached the agreements
by terminating Humphries as an employee. Courts need to
reconcile these kinds of inconsistencies. Bennion v. LeGrand
Johnson Constr. Co., 701 P.2d 1078, 1083 (Utah 1985). However,
where the two cannot be reconciled, as in this case, the more
specific finding must govern the outcome. £Lf . Knape v.
Livingston Oil Co., 193 Kan. 278, 392 P.2d 842, 844 (1964) ("If
special findings cannot be reconciled with the general verdict
and are sufficiently full and complete in themselves, and are
not inconsistent in themselves, judgment must follow the special
findings."); Johnson v. Tradewell Stores, Inc., 24 Wash. App.
53, 600 P.2d 583, 585 (1979) ("A special finding inconsistent
with the general verdict controls."). Thus, we hold that the
court appropriately dismissed the wrongful termination claim
since Wright had good cause, as a matter of law, to terminate
Humphries.10
ATTORNEY FEES
Wright challenges the award of attorney fees to Humphries
as not being rationally based. The jury was instructed that
"the prevailing party in this action is entitled to a reasonable
10. Humphries cites us to Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Constr.
Co., 701 P.2d 1078 (Utah 1985), for the proposition that "[w]hen
special interrogatories or verdicts are ambiguous, counsel has
an obligation either to object to the filing of the verdict or
to move that the cause be resubmitted to the jury for
clarification." Id. at 1083. As counsel recognized, the
purpose of this rule is to avoid "the expense and additional
time for a new trial by having the jury which heard the facts
clarify the ambiguity while it is able to do so." Id,. In this
case, the trial court obviated the need for this formality by
recognizing the inconsistency and seeking immediate
clarification from the jury.

attorney's fee incurred in connection herewith." Based upon
this instruction, the jury awarded Humphries $10,000 in attorney
fees. 11 Although we have significantly modified the judgment
on appeal, Humphries still appears to be properly regarded as
the party who prevailed at trial. See generally Mountain States
Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551, 555-57 (Utah Ct. App.
1989). However, he did not hold on to all of his trial victory
on appeal and some adjustment may be necessary so that he does
not recover fees attributable to issues on which he did not
prevail. See id. at 556 n.10. On the other hand, "while not
enjoying total success on this appeal," Wright is properly
regarded as the party who prevailed on appeal and "is entitled
on remand to an award of [his] attorney fees reasonably incurred
on appeal." I&. at 557. See id. at 557 n.ll. We accordingly
remand for further consideration of attorney fees and for such
further proceedings and relief as may be appropriate in that
regard. See generally Halladay v. Cluff, 739 P.2d 643, 645 n.5
(Utah Ct. App. 1987).
CONCLUSION
Humphries failed to prove fraud against Wright and we
therefore reverse the $38,582.00 award. The trial court should
have exonerated the injunction bond upon the proper motion of
Wright and, thus, we remand to the trial court for appropriate
relief in this respect.
We also remand to the trial court for

11. The jury instruction regarding attorney fees was broader
than the provision in the Purchase Agreement which only provided
for recovery of fees to the prevailing party who was "enforcing
performance of any covenant or representation hereunder or for
damages for breach thereof." The instruction given allowed the
jury to award fees to the party who prevailed in the action.
Neither party objected to this instruction and both thereby
acquiesced in the instruction as given. Nor did either party
object to having the jury make the attorney fee decision, a
matter ordinarily better entrusted to the court.
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further consideration of attorney fees.
raised on appeal, we affirm.

WE CONCUR:

Russell W. Bench, Judge

Judith M. Billings, Judge

As to the other issues

GARY W. PENDLETON
Attorney for Plaintiff
150 North Second East, Suite 202
St. George, Utah 84770
Ph:
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
GEORGE RONALD WRIGHT,
Plaintiff,

BILL OF COSTS

vs.
WESTSIDE NURSERY, a Utah
limited partnership and
DARREL HUMPHRIES, an
individual,

Civil No. 85-0536

Defendant.
Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 34(c) and Rule 34(d),
R. Utah Ct. App., Plaintiff presents the following Memorandum of
Costs incurred on the appeal in the above-entitled action:
Appeal filing fee (District Court)

$

Docketing fee (Court of Appeals)

30.00
1 2 5 . 00

Transcript cost

2 ,922 .50

Printing of Exhibits incorporated
into Appellant's brief

42 .05

Printing and binding briefs

159 .80

Bond premiums incurred during
pendency on appeal

2 , 0 0 0 .00

Total Costs incurred

^/'33^

A

$5 ,279 .35

h

j i

STATE OF UTAH

)
SS.
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON)
Gary W. Pendleton, being first duly sworn upon oath
deposes and says that he is the attorney for the Plaintiff in the
above-entitled action and as such is better informed relative to
the above costs and disbursements than the said Defendant; that the
items contained in the memorandum are true and correct to the best
of affiant's knowledge and belief and that said disbursements have
been necessarily incurred in said action.
DATED this

I

day of March, 1990-

£li
Garyr W. Pendleton
Attorney for Plaintiff
STATE OF UTAH

)
SS.
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON)

7

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this
'__ day of March,
1990/ by Gary W^^«Bld3$±pn who personally appeared before and
executed the fosnoiirftf?dQcfenent.

6
&£_
OTARY PUBLIC
©siding at St. George, Utah

My Commission

5' 3 ^ 97y******
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I do hereby certify that on this
7
day of March,
1990, I did personally mail a true and correct copy of the above
and foregoing Memorandum to Hans Q. Chamberlain, Attorney at Law,
P. 0. Box 726, Cedar City, Utah &4721.
Secretary
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GARY W. PENDLETON USB #2564
Attorney for Plaintiff
150 North Second East, Suite 202
St. George, Utah 84770
Ph: 628-4411

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
GEORGE RONALD WRIGHT,

]

Plaintiff,
vs.

]|

ORDER ASSESSING ATTORNEY'S
FEES INCURRED ON APPEAL,
DIRECTING DISBURSEMENTS OF
SUPERSEDEAS BOND AND
EXONERATING PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION BOND

;|

WESTSIDE NURSERY, a Utah
limited partnership and
DARREL HUMPHRIES, an
individual,

]>
]
>

Civil No. 85-0536

Defendant.
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing
on Plaintiff's motion to reduce the attorney's fees awarded to
Defendants at trial and to assess attorney's

fees reasonably

incurred on appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals.
appeared

Plaintiff

in person and by and through his attorney, Gary W.

Pendleton and Defendants appeared by and through their attorney,
Hans Q. Chamberlain.

The Court having heard the statements of

counsel and having taken evidence regarding the issue of attorney's
fees and having reviewed the opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals
and being fully advised in the premises entered the following
orders:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
attorney's fees awarded Defendants at trial are not reduced because
1

the jury was not requested to disclose the basis of their award of
the attorney's fees and the Court is not going to speculate in that
area.
IT
Plaintiff

IS

FURTHER

recover

from

ORDERED,

ADJUDGED

Defendant

the

sum

AND
of

DECREED

that

$8,152.50

as

reimbursement for attorney's fees reasonably incurred on appeal to
the Utah Court of Appeals, the Court having found the same to be
reasonably and necessarily incurred.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff recover no costs on
appeal and his Bill of Costs filed on March 7, 1990, is hereby
stricken.

This order is made on the grounds and for the reasons

that the opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals does not specifically
award Plaintiff costs on appeal and such costs are not recoverable
by application of Rule 34, Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the District
Court immediately disburse the funds now held as supersedeas bond
in the above-entitled matter from which the sum of $26,314.72 shall
be paid over to the Defendants

and their attorney, Hans Q.

Chamberlain, and the balance of which shall be paid over to the
Plaintiff and his attorney, Gary W. Pendleton.
The amount due Defendants is calculated by beginning with
the $20,198.21 awarded to Defendants as reimbursement for that
portion of the $30,000.00 loan which made its way into the Westside
Nursery Account and was used to pay obligations for which Plaintiff
was ultimately responsible.

To that sum is added the attorney's

fees awarded Defendants at trial.

2

From this sum is subtracted the attorney's fees Plaintiff
incurred on appeal.
Post Judgment interest (589 days at 12% per annum) is
added to the adjusted award.
Expressed mathematically:
Items awarded Defendants:
Reimbursement

$20,198.21

Attorney's Fees awarded Defendants
(not modified)

10,000.00

TOTAL AWARD

$30,198.21

Adjustments:
Costs on appeal (none awarded)

-0-

Attorney's Fees awarded Plaintiff
on appeal

$8,152.50

TOTAL ADJUSTMENTS

-8,152.50

ADJUSTED AWARD

$22,045.71

Post Judgment Interest
TOTAL DISBURSEMENT TO DEFENDANT

$4,269.01
$26,314*72

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that upon
disbursement of the supersedeas bond as more specifically set forth
above, all monetary judgments entered by this Court in the aboveentitled action shall be fully satisfied.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
preliminary injunction bond in the amount of $50,000.00 posted by

3

the Plaintiff in the above-entitled action is hereby exonerated and
the surety is discharged.
DATED this

9^^-

day of March, 1990
J. Jphilip Eve
District Judge

^£ppxpvedr as to~form and extent:
Han^ Q. Chamberlain
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